CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 75
2000
NUMBER 3
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM ON UNFINISHED
FEMINIST BUSINESS
Symposium Editor
Anita Bernstein
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Anita Bernstein |
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What Is to Be Done? |
Kate Millett |
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Since
its existence, the feminist movement has fought for equal rights for women,
and, in so doing, it has challenged the oldest and most fundamental social
scheme in history—patriarchy. Patriarchy is the rule of males over females
in all departments of human life, and it is based on custom, belief, law,
and ultimately on force. Although
the American feminist movement made significant progress in its early years,
it has struggled in recent years to accomplish many of its goals. Millett notes that the American feminist movement
now stands stalemated, on the defensive, and trying desperately to hold on
to the gains it has made. Millett
argues that the American feminist movement still can bring about the last
days of patriarchy by aligning itself with the international feminist movement.
There, feminists have brought about great change by ratifying documents
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
This document, which is still unratified by the United States, is set
up with mechanisms that allow nations to bring about sexual equality.
Because it challenges patriarchy generally and the American right wing
in particular, Millett argues, the Convention
has been kept forcibly out of public discussion in the United States. Paradoxically, its obscurity testifies to its
power.
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Kelly Kleiman |
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Performance in drag is indistinguishable
conceptually from performance in blackface, yet the former is embraced while
the latter is shunned. This Essay
argues that the analogy is powerful enough to justify making drag performance
anathema. It outlines the parallel
features of the two modes of performance and then rebuts the common defenses of
drag performance—that drag subverts gender stereotypes, that it is a matter of
private sexual compulsion, that it is a privileged activity of gay men, and
that it’s just a joke.
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Catharine A. MacKinnon |
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In this Essay, MacKinnon pointedly
contends with a central tropism in much postmodernism to “de-realize” reality,
contrasting it with feminism’s epistemic and legal accomplishments and
potential in remaking the world for women.
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Penelope E. Bryan |
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Bryan first explores the disconnect
between the feminist goal of equality
for women and women’s experience at divorce.
Divorce continues to devastate women’s economic prospects, frequently
deprives them of their children, and sometimes compromises their physical
safety. Many feminists have proposed
changes to existing law and procedure that offer to protect women’s interests
in their children, in marital assets, and in their physical safety. Yet theoretical and strategical rifts
between feminists continue to compromise their political ability to promote
women’s interests in divorce. Bryan
urges feminists to abandon these differences and return to the basic “woman
question” by supporting legal changes that respond to the voices of divorced
women. Even if feminists unite around a
divorce agenda, however, external factors provide formidable obstacles. If feminists lobby male-dominated state
legislatures for reforms favorable to women, they can expect legislators to
resist reforms contrary to their own interests. If feminists litigate and/or appeal cases that present the
opportunity to create precedent favorable to women, they face judges biased
against women.
While Bryan recognizes the danger of such
a proposal, she urges feminists to develop a political agenda focused more on
the interests of children than on the equality of women. She notes that women, as caretakers of most
divorced children, would benefit from such reforms. She justifies this approach by arguing that male legislators
might find such an agenda less threatening and, perhaps, more morally and
socially compelling than an agenda based on equality between men and
women. To confront judicial bias, Bryan
recommends that only committed and educated judges should preside over divorce
cases. She concludes with a call to all
feminists to recognize the importance of divorce issues to women and to
mobilize as effectively as they have on other women’s issues.
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Richard Kamm |
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Migrant farmworker women are among the
poorest of the working poor.
Historically marginalized and disenfranchised by feminists and the legal
community, as well as by male farmworker activists, migrant farmworker women
continue to be plagued by problems of employment discrimination, workplace
sexual harassment, and domestic violence.
While some feminist legal scholars have argued that the solution to such
problems is to make the feminist movement more inclusive and to move away from
taking the experiences of white middle-class women as representative of the
experiences of all women, Kamm argues that a better alternative would be to
provide migrant farmworker women with the resources they need so that they can
empower themselves.
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Lila Lee |
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In 1985, a group of women
called the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (“FACT”) filed a brief that
was influential in the Seventh Circuit’s decision—subsequently summarily affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court—to invalidate Indianapolis’ antipornography
civil rights ordinance. The brief
callously discounted the very existence, and the substance, of extensive victim
testimony given by women at the public hearings held in support of the proposed
ordinance. Apparently, the writers
of the brief existed in a fantasy world, far removed from the lives of women
who testified publicly that pornography harmed them.
While victim testimony established that
women harmed by pornography wanted a civil remedy to empower themselves against
makers and users of pornography who had hurt them, FACT’s brief stated that the
antipornography ordinance was foisted upon women by right-wing men. While victim testimony established that
women suffered physical and dignitary harms when they were used to make
pornography or coerced to consume pornography, FACT’s brief stated that
pornography consists of images and fantasies, no more harmful than the
bogeyman. While victims testified that
their lives were devastated by pornography, FACT’s brief argued that a civil
ordinance that might raise the cost of pornography by damages paid to victims
would deprive consumers by raising prices or putting pornographers out of
business. While victims testified of
their first-hand experience that pornography hurt them, FACT’s brief
effectively argued that the only credible opinions were those of male experts
who studied pornography’s effects in laboratories and concluded that there was
no harm. While victimized women
testified that they were coerced into “consenting” to make, consume, or reenact
pornography, with damage to their civil rights resulting, FACT’s brief argued
that for a woman to contest the “consent” she gave denies her agency.
The same head-in-the-sand denial that
enabled the writers of FACT’s brief to ignore victim testimony and maintain a
fantasy that pornography does not hurt women runs rampant today in both liberal
and conservative views on pornography.
The fantasy that pornography hurts no one is a part of feminism’s past
and of feminism’s present. It must give
way to an honoring of victims’ testimony so that feminism can go forward into
its future.
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Katharine K. Baker |
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Feminists and sociobiologists have more
in common than many people realize. In
this Essay, Baker argues that feminists can use insights from sociobiology to
validate feminist theories about patriarchy and to bolster claims for a greater
legal commitment to feminist normative agendas. Paying particular attention to the laws regarding rape, marriage,
and parenthood, Baker shows how biology helps confirm what feminists have long
argued about the law’s inadequate protection of women. Moreover, she shows how biology helps
demonstrate the keen need for feminist social norms that help alleviate the
harms caused by nature’s inequities.
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Jennifer Gerarda Brown |
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In this Essay, Brown revisits the issue
of single-sex education, questioning the wisdom of her own earlier proposal that
a women’s law school could remedy the alienation, underachievement, and
silencing that women are said to experience in law school. The Essay addresses two questions. First, as a growing body of empiricism in
some ways supports but in other ways undermines earlier claims that sex is the
characteristic most determinative of law school experience, the Essay considers
whether a remedy based on sex is viable.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Essay draws upon Vivian
Paley’s work with very young children, documented in her book You Can’t Say You Can’t Play, and
considers the costs of a women’s law school for those outside its walls. Recognizing the pain that sex segregation
can cause, the Essay considers whether men who are dissatisfied with law school
would feel excluded from a remedy that might have helped them. The Essay then
explores the rationales for exclusion, particularly when practiced by
historically disempowered people, and concludes that norms of inclusion and
antisubordination must be balanced in any reform of women’s legal education.
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Tracy E. Higgins |
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In this Essay, Higgins explores the various
uses of the public/private distinction in feminist theorizing.She suggests
that feminist attacks on the public/private line tend to overstate the threat
that the concept poses to women=s equality and to understate the potential value
of the distinction in feminist theory. Acknowledging
that, despite thoroughgoing theoretical critiques, the public/private line
persists in practice, Higgins offers a qualified revival of the distinction
in feminist theory and suggests ways of refocusing and refining it to respond
to existing critiques.
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Reem Bahdi |
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Women’s use of the Internet has received
very little attention from feminist legal commentators. While they increasingly turn to it as a
source of information and as an advocacy tool, feminist legal scholars and
advocates have failed to analyze the Internet in terms of its significance to
women. In this Essay, Bahdi argues that
feminists must be concerned that access to the Internet is often limited to
relatively privileged women in relatively privileged countries. Yet, we can harness the Internet in the
promotion of women’s rights and recognize it as an important feminist medium,
as long as we understand its strengths and take its shortcomings into
consideration. Indeed, the strengths
and shortcomings of the Internet parallel to a large extent those identified by
feminists in the rights debate; and the rights debate provides an established
framework for assessing the Internet’s efficacy—in particular, its role in the
feminist agenda of promoting dignity and equality for women. Bahdi thus begins her analysis of the
Internet on the familiar terrain laid out by the feminist debate over rights
claims. First, she briefly sets out the
debate over rights in the context of international human rights law and the
evolving norms of violence against women.
Next, she turns to the Internet and seeks to draw parallels between the
rights debate and the Internet’s efficacy in advancing women’s rights. Finally, Bahdi discusses the need for
vigilance and constant evaluation of our use of the Internet, identifying some
strategies that can help make the Internet more accessible to women and women’s
groups around the world.
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Orit Kamir |
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This Essay offers a model for systematic
application of “feminist law and film” methodology to investigating the imagery
of law and justice; to reexamining the relationship between feminist theory that
focuses on an ethics of care and feminist theory that focuses on dominance,
oppression, and resistance; and to reviewing the relationship between legal
feminism and postmodernity. More
specifically, employing interdisciplinary methodology, the Essay explores the
imagery of a newly developing legal-feminist concept, “caring justice,” by
focusing on popular cultural images of the judiciary as presented by the film
industry. Offering a close reading of a
contemporary film, Pedro Almodovar’s High
Heels, the Essay reveals how the film offers a radical and feminist
alternative to that of Solomonic justice, which dominates our Judeo-Christian
heritage. In High Heels, law, embodied
in the image of a male judge in drag, is both motherly and fatherly, son and lover,
subjective and caring, and above all thoroughly humane and differently
just. This Essay argues that the film’s
imagery of judge and law suggestively expands our contemporary pantheon of
images of the judiciary.
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Jane S. Schacter |
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In this Essay, Schacter examines recent
judicial decisions on so-called “second-parent adoption,” in which one partner
in a gay or lesbian relationship seeks to adopt the other partner’s child
without terminating that partner’s legal relationship with the child. With the recent boom of lesbian families in
particular, the availability of such adoptions has been litigated in several
states. Although the results have
been uneven, this has been an area of significant progress for same sex families,
with courts in at least twenty-one states having authorized such adoptions.
The appellate rulings in this area have been decisions involving statutory
interpretation and have turned on how courts construe existing adoption laws,
which are characteristically ambiguous on this point.
Favorable decisions have fallen victim to claims of “judicial activism,”
premised on the notion that considerations of democratic theory require legislatures—not
courts—to decide whether second-parent adoptions will be available.
Schacter examines this democratic objection and finds it lacking.
She argues that even on a conventional, majoritarian account of democracy,
the appellate decisions authorizing adoption are on solid ground.
She then argues that this conventional account of democracy is impoverished
in ways that are nicely illustrated by these cases and concludes that the
cases, in fact, exemplify and are consistent with a thicker set of democratic
values that emphasize social pluralism and a strong commitment to social equality.
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Victoria Nourse |
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Feminist reforms have brought both success
and failure to the criminal law in the past several decades. Nourse examines this simultaneous success and
failure in three different areas: rape
reform, marital rape immunities, and self-defense law. Her analysis urges that the criminal law has
not been able to shake itself free of social norms governing intimate relationships—social
norms that tend to perpetuate the very sexism feminists aimed to extinguish.
Relational norms are upwardly mobile and easily nurtured by the “deliberate
ambiguities” necessary to forge legislative and judicial change.
Nourse argues that, in this sense, the failures of feminist reform
should not be cause for dismay, but are a “normal” incident of a process that
demands continued effort and attention.
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Susan E. Cowell |
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This Note proposes pretrial mediation
using scientist-mediators for complex scientific disputes. Complex scientific disputes reflect the
inherent tension between law and science.
This tension results in dissatisfaction among judges, juries, and
scientists because of the uncertainties embraced by science, but eschewed by
law. Pretrial mediation would address
some of these uncertainties before they are introduced into the courtroom. In short, the proposed pretrial mediation
should reduce jury confusion and provide judges with guidance to assess the
admissibility of scientific evidence and expert opinions by eliminating and
clarifying scientific issues.