CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM ON
CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS
Symposium Editor
Graeme B. Dinwoodie
Introduction:
Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The Role of National
Courts
The
Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System
[Pdf File]
Graeme B. Dinwoodie 991
Graeme B. Dinwoodie 993
In
this Article, Professor Dinwoodie describes the classical architecture of the
international intellectual property system, and discusses some of the ways in
which that system is changing. In
particular, he considers the role of national courts in the international
intellectual property system.
Conventional understanding suggests that national courts play a
relatively limited role, but Professor Dinwoodie notes various developments
that have enabled or required national courts to assume greater involvement in
the construction of international intellectual property law. The infrastructure envisaged by the proposed
Hague Convention, and by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg in their proposal for
a standalone convention on jurisdiction and judgments in intellectual property
matters, might also enhance the role of such national judicial activity. Professor Dinwoodie concludes by suggesting
the ways in which national courts operating within such an infrastructure could
make a positive contribution to the construction of international intellectual
property law.
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Nineteenth Session: Summary of the Outcome of the
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6–20
June 2001 (Interim Text)
Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Commission II 1015
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Judgements in Intellectual Property Matters
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss
and Jane C. Ginsburg 1065
This proposal is meant to spur the intellectual property
bar to consider whether it would be desirable to create a regime for
international enforcement of intellectual property law judgments. Such a convention could be adopted under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) or through
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
There are several reasons to believe that an instrument
drafted specifically for intellectual property disputes would be particularly
advantageous. First, for intellectual
property disputes, efficiency should be a principal target. Modern distribution methods, particularly
satellite and Internet transmissions, make it increasing likely that
intellectual property rights will be exploited simultaneously in more than one
territory. The ability to consolidate
claims arising from these usages in one court, with the expectation that the
judgment of that court will be recognized in all convention States, could
reduce costs for all sides, conserve judicial resources on an international
basis, and promote consistent outcomes.
Second, a convention drafted for intellectual property
disputes can take account of issues uniquely raised by the intangibility of the
rights in issue. For example, an
intellectual property agreement can consider the ability of a potential
defendant to gain litigation advantages through the choice of the location of
the activities that give rise to infringement.
In certain situations, the propriety of expanding jurisdiction depends
on the possibility of inconsistent outcomes; a convention tailored to
intellectual property can specify what that term means in the context of public
goods.
An instrument for intellectual property litigation can also
deal specifically with matters of unique concern to the creative community. The strong link between culture on the one
hand, and intellectual production and utilization on the other, means that
the territoriality of these rights is of crucial importance: individual nations
must be able to retain some control over the local conditions under which these
products are created, exploited, and accessed.
At the same time, an approach that creates new avenues for
cross-cultural enrichment needs to be considered. For example, the circumstances where trans-border injunctions are
permissible can be specified to include consideration of cultural, health, and safety
issues. Other issues of prime interest
to the information industries can also be considered: provisions on contract
disputes can be tailored to deal with mass -market
contracts, which are becoming prevalent in certain intellectual property
transactions; provisions on infringement can be made sensitive to the interests
of the “new media,” such as Internet Service Providers.
Most important, the convention can be confined to rights covered
by the intellectual property part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(the “TRIPs Agreement”) and open to
signature only to countries that have joined the WTO and fully implemented the
TRIPs Agreement. Since these are
countries that have agreed to enforce intellectual property law and are subject
to dispute resolution proceedings if they fail to do so, these limitations
would reduce concerns that forum shopping will undermine the delicate balance
that each nation has struck between the rights of intellectual property users
and owners. And although dispute
resolution under the WTO cannot provide litigants with a substitute for a
centralized and authoritative appellate body (such as the US Supreme Court or
the European Court of Justice), it can provide assurance of transparent and
efficient judicial process, along with institutional mechanisms (such as
dispute resolution panels, the Dispute Settlement Board, and the Council for
TRIPs) for examining intellectual property law as it develops through
consolidated adjudication of multinational disputes.
Valuing
“Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual Property
Jurisdiction
Graeme W. Austin 1155
In an era of increased globalization of
intellectual property law and policy, a key challenge for domestic and
international intellectual property law makers will be the balancing of
domestic and international concerns. In
intellectual property law, the latter are frequently given expression through
the principle of territoriality.
Professor Austin’s Article examines the continued viability of the
territoriality principle and the value of domestic self-determination in
international intellectual property jurisprudence in both the private and
public international law contexts, and discusses ways that the value of
domestic self-determination might be balanced with the need for international
cooperation in the international intellectual property context. This analysis provides a framework for
scrutiny of the Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters
proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg.
Professor Austin explores ways in which the draft convention is and is
not consistent with the value of domestic self-determination.
International Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgements in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of,
Goals for, and Comments on the Current Proposals
Jonathan A. Franklin
and Roberta J. Morris 1213
The Hague Convention attempts to
harmonize bases of jurisdiction and make enforcement of foreign judgments
routine. At the same time, the
diversity in substantive national laws in intellectual property and other areas
permits nations to experiment with new and different approaches. A good international legal system will
improve transnational litigation without running roughshod over national
socio-cultural values, as embodied especially in intellectual property
law. This Article ponders disparate
factors that could diminish the importance of the whole effort, considers some
values that should guide the effort if it is to go forward, and then reviews
how selected provisions of the draft Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsberg
proposal meet these challenges.
Comment: Now That We Know
“The Way Forward,” Let Us Stay the Course
Marc E. Hankin 1295
Mr. Hankin, a partner practicing
intellectual property law in the Los Angeles Office of Gordon & Rees, LLP
and the Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property
Law’s Committee on the Draft Hague Convention, comments on the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal and its tension with current legal procedural norms
and the Draft Hague Convention. Hankin
argues that intellectual property law should not be treated differently
procedurally from other forms of law and, accordingly, should not be subject to
a special convention on procedure.
Moreover, Hankin disagrees with the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal’s likely
exclusion of patent litigation (“hard IP”) from its scope. Such an exclusion is unnecessary and would
limit the proposal’s applicability. The
Draft Hague Convention benefits from not distinguishing between “hard” and
“soft” intellectual property, and while the Hague Convention still faces many
challenges, directing our efforts towards improving it is the best way to
address the increasingly complex issues affecting international intellectual
property law.
In
this Article, Professor Van Alstine examines the costs of legal transition
associated with the adoption of multilateral treaties. These “legal transition costs” arise from
the need to learn about the content of new legal norms as well as the
uncertainty and related costs that flow from the loss of the accrued experience
with the old legal regime and from contending with doubts about the new
one. Building on earlier work on this
phenomenon, Professor Van Alstine analyzes the special implications of
transition cost analysis in the context of multilateral treaties such as the
one proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg in the field of international
intellectual property law.
A game-theoretic analysis of forum
shopping reveals how opportunities for strategic choices can influence the
behavior of plaintiffs and defendants.
If neither party has the opportunity to make strategic choices about
participation or forum, we should expect no adverse selection or moral hazard
problems. Conversely, if only one of
the parties can control both the participation and forum selection choices,
then we could expect pervasive adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. In this Article, we build on
this simple game-theoretic framework to analyze Dreyfuss and Ginsburg’s Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters. We suggest that if the parties are faced
with a bilateral strategic problem (i.e., if one party has control over one
strategic choice and the other party has control over the other strategic
choice), the extent of opportunistic behavior by either party, and the
resulting deadweight losses, are likely to be minimized. In this respect, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal sensibly minimizes the strategic problems of forum shopping and
creates an enforcement scheme that leaves intact the innovation incentives underlying
intellectual property rights.
STUDENT NOTES
Eliminating the Totality
of the Circumstances Test for the Public Use Bar under Section 102(b) of the
Patent Act
Margaret L. Begalle
1359
Historically, courts have applied a
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a public use or sale of
an invention had taken place that would bar patentability under Section 102(b)
of the Patent Act. The totality of the
circumstances test is burdened by ambiguity and vagueness, which in turn leaves
inventors with uncertainty as to which activities trigger the 102(b) bars. In 1998, however, the Supreme Court in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
replaced the totality of the circumstances test as applied to the on-sale bar
with a clearer two-part test. In
determining whether the on-sale bar applies, courts now use a two-part,
ready-for-patenting test. An invention
is considered “on sale” within the meaning of 102(b) if: (1) the invention has
been the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale; and (2) the invention
is ready for patenting. The Pfaff test gives inventors more clarity
by providing more definite guidelines as to what constitutes a sale under
102(b). However, the ambiguous and
vague totality of the circumstances test is still applied by courts when
determining public use under 102(b).
Following the lead of Pfaff,
this Note proposes that the totality of the circumstances test as applied to
the public use bar be replaced by a clearer two-part test. Under the proposed test, an invention is in
“public use” when: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by or visible to
someone other than the inventor or those under the inventor’s direction; and
(2) the invention has been reduced to practice. The test provides a more definite rule for determining whether an
invalidating public use has occurred.
This, in turn, allows inventors to conform their activities so as not to
be barred from patentability under the 102(b) public use bar. The proposed test also seeks to provide a
degree of uniformity in cases dealing with the public use bar.
Has the Americans with
Disabilities Act Fallen on Deaf Ears? A Post-Sutton Analysis of Mitigating Measures in the Seventh Circuit
Molly M. Joyce 1389
Although the Americans with Disabilities
Act was lauded as a statute that would bring long-overdue relief to the
disabled, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton
v. United Airlines has caused many to question the statute’s value. By holding that plaintiffs must be
considered in their corrected or mitigated states, Sutton greatly narrowed the
group of individuals entitled to relief under the statute. Recent Seventh Circuit holdings have illustrated
Sutton’s shortcomings, namely that
courts will be required to consider disabled plaintiffs’ corrected states even
if their employers discriminate against them by not allowing them to employ
their assistive devices or corrective measures while on the job. This Note proposes that under these narrow
circumstances, when there is a reasonable probability that the employer is
discriminating on the basis of the mitigating measure itself, courts should
consider a plaintiff in his or her uncorrected state.